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UPDATE ON CUBA’S NON-SUGAR AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Mario A. González Corzo

In its recent efforts to transform (or “update”) its
economic model, Cuba has understandably focused
on its agricultural sector. Even though it only accounts for approximately 5% of gross domestic product (GDP), agriculture represents a relatively large
share of the Cuban economy (some 20%) due to its
direct linkages with other sectors and multiplier effect (Nova González, 2006). Despite the expansion
of tourism and services, Cuba still remains an agricultural country, and agriculture touches every aspect
of the country’s economic and social life.

sector’s evolution during the “pre-reform period” of
2005–2008, focusing on total output and yields.
This is followed by an overview of recent policy measures (or “reforms”) implemented by Cuba to reactivate its agricultural sector and reduce its external dependency on imported food and food products. The
last section analyzes the recent performance (2008 to
the present) of Cuba’s non-agricultural sector and
the impact of the transformations that have taken
place so far.

Since Raúl Castro’s official ascent to power on February 24, 2008, a series of policy measures have been
implemented to prioritize and reactivate this vital
sector of the Cuban economy. The most significant
include: the approval of Decree-Law No. 259 of
2008, which facilitates the transfers of idle Stateowned lands to private producers and agricultural cooperatives; the transfer of some of the functions performed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI)
to the Ministry of Interior Trade (MINCIN); the
creation of a limited number of State-operated establishments to sell basic agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds,
fertilizer, work gloves, machetes, axes, etc.) to small
agricultural producers; experiments with “suburban
agriculture” to connect local producers and consumers and reduce fuel, transportation and storage costs;
and increases in the prices paid by Acopio, the Staterun agricultural procurement agency, to private
farmers and cooperatives producing milk, beans, rice,
and other products.

PERFORMANCE DURING THE
“PRE-REFORM” PERIOD (2005 -2008)

This paper explores the principal transformations
that have occurred in Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural
sector in recent years. The first section examines the

In recent years, Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector
has been characterized by declining output levels,
falling yields and growing dependency on food imports (particularly from the United States). As Table
1 shows, between 2005 and 2008, physical output
declined in nine out of eleven categories. For instance, the production of roots and tubers, tobacco,
citrus fruits, and cocoa suffered double digit declines
during this period. This was the combined result of
natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and severe
drought), low factor productivity, difficulties with
the acquisition of essential inputs (e.g., fertilizers),
insufficient equipment and machinery, the lack of
price incentives (to stimulate production), etc.
As Table 2 illustrates, yields (or output per cultivated
area) also declined significantly during the 2005–
2008 period. The crops with the most notable declines were: cocoa, tobacco, citrus fruits, beans, legumes, and greens. While natural disasters were a
major contributor, lower yields were also the result of
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Table 1.
Viandas
Roots and tubers
Plantains
Greens
Cereals
Rice
Corn
Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus Fruits
Other Fruits
Cocoa

Cuba: Non-Sugar Agricultural Output (In Tons)
2005
2,575,300
1,801,800
773,500
3,203,500
730,100
367,600
362,500
106,200
106,200
26,000
554,600
819,000
2,067

2006
2,202,000
1,330,200
871,800
2,672,100
739,600
434,200
305,400
70,600
70,600
29,700
373,000
746,500
2,120

2007
2,369,500
1,378,600
990,900
2,603,000
808,400
439,600
368,800
97,200
97,200
25,600
469,000
783,800
1,379

2008
2,150,700
1,392,500
758,200
2,439,300
761,700
436,000
325,700
97,200
97,200
21,500
391,800
738,500
1,100

Change
2005 -2008
-424,600
-409,300
-15,300
-764,200
31,600
68,400
-36,800
-9,000
-9,000
-4,500
-162,800
-80,500
-967

% Change
-16.5%
-22.7%
-2.0%
-23.9%
4.3%
18.6%
-10.2%
-8.5%
-8.5%
-17.3%
-29.4%
-9.8%
-46.8%

Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.

Table 2.
Viandas
Roots and tubers
Plantains
Greens
Cereals
Rice
Corn
Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus fruits
Other Fruits
Cocoa

Cuba: Non-Sugar Agricultural, Yields, Selected Crops (Tons per Hectare)
2005
7.42
7.16
8.11
10.28
2.58
2.89
2.33
1.12
1.12
1.28
9.86
10.11
0.51

2006
7.78
7.27
8.71
11.53
2.79
3.04
2.50
0.92
0.92
1.10
6.73
9.71
0.53

2007
7.73
6.76
9.67
11.28
2.91
3.23
2.61
1.16
1.16
1.12
9.60
7.84
0.50

2008
7.69
7.10
9.07
9.42
2.68
2.80
2.52
1.02
1.02
0.93
8.59
8.89
0.29

Change
2005 - 2008
0.27
-0.06
0.96
-0.86
0.09
-0.09
0.19
-0.10
-0.10
-0.35
-1.27
-1.22
-0.22

% Change
3.6%
-0.8%
11.8%
-8.4%
3.6%
-3.0%
8.2%
-8.9%
-8.9%
-27.1%
-12.9%
-12.1%
-43.2%

Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.

insufficient capital and labor inputs and reduced factor productivity.

U.S. exports to Cuba from 2001 to July 2010
reached an estimated $3.4 billion (USCTEC, 2010).

In addition to declining output levels and falling
yields in non-sugar agriculture, the Cuban economy
has experienced an increased dependency on food
imports. Since the approval of the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) in 2000,
the United States has emerged as Cuba’s principal
supplier of imported food and agricultural products.
In 2001, the total value of U.S food and agricultural
exports to Cuba reached a meager $4.3 million
(U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council [USCTEC], 2010); this figure increased to approximately $528.5 million by the end of 2009 (USCTEC,
2010), and the cumulative value of TSRA-authorized

Despite these impressive figures, U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba have declined substantially
since 2008. Between January 2010 and July 2010,
for instance, U.S. food and agricultural exports to
Cuba were $182.3 million, compared to $278.2 million during a like period in 2009, representing a decrease of 35% (USCTEC, 2010). The decline of
U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba can be attributed to three factors. First, Cuba has experienced
a liquidity and macroeconomic crisis since 2008,
which has limited its access to foreign exchange and
international sources of (credit) financing, thereby
reducing its ability to purchase food and agricultural
products from the U.S., which must be paid in cash.
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Second, Cuba’s growing ties (and interdependence)
with its two principal trading partners, Venezuela
and China, have reduced its need to purchase products from the U.S. Third, growing importance of direct bilateral, and in many cases barter-based, trade
agreements between Cuba and countries that offer
the island favorable terms and conditions, often motivated by strategic and political considerations (e.g.,
China, Iran and Spain) have provided Cuba with alternative sources of imports.
RECENT POLICY MEASURES
Falling agricultural output and yields, low labor productivity, high levels of waste and inefficiency, the
rising costs of food imports, and the deterioration of
the trade balance, have placed food production at the
forefront of the economic challenges confronting
Cuba at the present time (Hagelberg, 2010). According to official statistics, Cuba spent $1.494 billion on
imported food and agricultural products in 2009,
representing 17% of the country’s total merchandise
imports for that year (Anuario Estadístico de Cuba
[AEC], 2009).
As it experienced the worst economic crisis since the
collapse of the Eastern European Socialist Bloc and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s, and confronted with a more favorable international environment, mainly as the result of its close
economic ties with Venezuela, China, and Canada,
and its extended diplomatic relations with virtually
every country in the Western Hemisphere and other
regions of the world, Cuba has implemented a series
of policy measures to transform its agricultural sector.
One of the first steps taken in this direction consisted
of paying higher prices to producers of certain agricultural products. This process was initiated in 2007,
when the State procurement agency, Acopio, increased the prices it paid milk producers as well as the
percentage paid in convertible pesos (CUC) per liter
produced and delivered. The resulting increase in
producers’ incomes resulting from this measure increased producers’ capacity to obtain essential inputs
to further increase production (Nova, 2010). These
price increases allowed Acopio to recover a part of this
production, which previously had other destinations,

and producers have been encouraged to sell their
product to Acopio. This measure constitutes a direct
stimulus to producers, and incentivizes them to indirectly contribute to certain savings in fuel and loss reductions because of timely deliveries made to Acopio.
This procedure has been implemented in 89 municipalities, of which 66 are fully self-sufficient. However, it has resulted in certain unintended consequences, which have contributed to reductions in deliveries
to industry, resulting in the under-utilization of the
country’s industrial capacity (Nova, 2010). Acopio
also increased the prices it pays to meat and poultry
producers. Payments in convertible pesos (CUC) to
meat and poultry producers have increased their purchasing power, allowing many of them to obtain essential agricultural inputs in recently-created hard
currency stores for this purpose (there are stores in 70
of the 168 existing municipalities).Unfortunately,
these stores tend to offer a limited variety of inputs of
about 64 products, supply has been unpredictable
and unreliable, and prices tend to be relatively high.
The second significant policy measure implemented
to transform Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector
was the transfer of idle State-owned land to cooperatives and individual producers pursuant to DecreeLaw No. 259 of July 2008. The implementation of
this measure is somewhat paradoxical since there is a
significant amount of idle lands (1,758, 962 hectares), valuable human capital, a significant number
of research centers and experimental stations, with
proven results, and available technology, but since
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Socialist Camp in the early 1990s, the
Cuban economy has been forced to import significant volumes of food, many of which can be produced domestically under more favorable conditions.
Decree-Law No. 259 clarifies important aspects of
Cuba’s most recent “agrarian reform,” the conditions
of usufruct under which idle State-owned lands will
be transferred to cooperatives and individual producers, the terms of economic ownership related to this
property form, and its relation to legal ownership
(Nova, 2010). It also helps to clarify important aspects, which until recently remained unclear or undefined, such as the period of time for which the usu-
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fruct is established, which helps define its economic
ownership and legal ownership, and the collection of
taxes and rents by the State.
In addition, Decree-Law No. 259 incorporates some
elements that were not taken into consideration in
previous agricultural reform measures, such as the
duration of transfers to natural persons (10 years, renewable leases, regardless of the type of crop harvested), and the transfers of land to legal entities such as
cooperatives (Nova, 2010). One interesting feature
that distinguishes Decree-Law No. 259 from previous legislation is that the terms of the usufruct, or
lease agreements, are standardized for specific periods
regardless of the types of crops produced, the modes
of production used to generate this output, and
whether or not the crops are considered short-cycle
or long-cycle, and the type of livestock raised by producers (Nova, 2010).
The degree of investment intensity related to agricultural production varies according to the type of crop
produced, or the type of livestock raised. Some products and forms of livestock are more labor and capital
intensive than others, and due to their seasonal nature require different quantities of labor and physical
and financial capital. Pursuant to Article 15 (of Decree-Law No. 259), once finalized, the terms of the
usufruct allow producers to receive payment or compensation from the State for bienhechurías, or infrastructure or physical improvements to the land and
facilities used for production, with the exception of
housing built by individual producers or cooperatives. This constraint or limit provides a distorted incentive to make the minimum investment required,
prevents the agricultural producers permanently settling in their newly acquired lands (leased from the
State), and explains why most of them despite the
positive advances made by Decree-Law No. 259,
consider themselves as transient (non-permanent)
producers. In reality, as Nova (2009, 2010) indicates,
the successful transformation of Cuba’s agricultural
sector requires the recampesinización, or the re-population of the countryside; without significant and
long-lasting increases in the quantity of farmers,
technicians, and administrative and managerial per-
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sonnel dedicated to agriculture, there is no guarantee
and stability of a sustainable agricultural production.
Cuba’s newly decentralized agricultural model must
recognize that agricultural producers require certain
facilities to store and preserve the essential inputs, animals, seeds, supplies, and equipment, among others.
To stimulate the migration of labor from other areas
of the economy into agriculture, policies that provide
economic incentives for investment in physical infrastructure and promote long-term commitments to
agriculture are being contemplated. To ensure the
success of this decentralized model of agricultural
production, where regional and local producers are
expected to develop strong linkages with the land in
which they work, and consumers and suppliers in
their respective “markets,” producers and administrative and managerial personnel need to live near or on
the locations where production takes, a sense of permanence and consistency must be encouraged and
developed, and the linkages between producers and
the lands in which production takes place must be
strengthened over time (Nova, 2010).
By the end of 2009, some 920,000 hectares of idle
State-owned lands had been transferred to more than
100,000 applicants, representing 52% of the total
(Nova, 2010). Until January 2010, there had been
121,711 applications, of which 98% are natural persons, of which approximately 79% were previously
landless (Nova, 2010). At present, it is estimated that
35% of the land delivered has been planted or cultivated (Nova, 2010). Considering the original conditions of the majority of this land, and the wide range
of challenges, constraints, and difficulties that nonState agricultural producers still face, this is indeed a
remarkable accomplishment.
Yet, despite the notable increases in the number of
applications from both cooperatives and individual
producers, the transfer of idle State-owned lands to
non-State producers has been characterized by a series of bureaucratic hurdles and impediments, which
still present serious difficulties. According to the provisions of Decree-Law 282, nine documents are required for processing of application for the transfer
of land in usufruct (Nova, 2010). To file a complaint
or appeal, applicants are required to complete and
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submit thirteen documents, and from the time the
applicant files the application for the transfer of land
with the municipal director of the Centro Nacional
del Control de la Tierra (National Center for Land
Control), the office has thirty days to review the application, and draft or prepare the required documentation, and up to sixty days to conduct the necessary surveys and medical examinations of the
livestock to be transferred from State ownership to
the non-State sector (Nova, 2010).Once the necessary documents are drawn, the municipal director of
the National Center for Land Control presents them
to the municipal delegate of agriculture in the term
of three days, and the latter has thirty days to review
and approve the requested transfer in usufruct (Nova,
2010).
Theoretically, it can take at least sixty-three days,
from the beginning of the application to lease idle
lands or livestock from the State for a predetermined
period of time, under the conditions previously described, until the formal documents are approved
and issued, assuming that process transpires normally
and does not require additional field surveys or measurements, and other bureaucratic steps or procedures. In such cases, the time needed to clear existing
bureaucratic hurdles and effectively transfer the land
or livestock from the State to the cooperative or private sectors can theoretically taken ninety-three (93)
days or even longer.
Another important measure in Cuba’s road towards a
more flexible and decentralized agricultural model
was the transfer of the collection activities, assigned
to the State-owned procurement agency, Acopio, to
the Ministry of Domestic Trade (Ministerio del Comercio Interior, MINCIN). For many experts in Cuban agriculture, this is considered as a road already
traveled. In 1976, procurement was transferred from
the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de la Agricultura, MINAGRI), but then returned to it after the
“Rectification Process” (RP) in 1986. Nova (2010)
and others consider that transferring Acopio’s functions to the MINAGRI would be a more logical and
appropriate step to improve the operational and administrative efficiency of Cuba’s cumbersome system
of agricultural procurement.

At present, Cuba’s agricultural procurement and
marketing system is hindered by a highly regulated
market, the distortions related to monetary dualism,
and insufficient output, particularly by the cooperative sector (which includes the Unidades Básicas de
Producción Cooperativa, UBPCs, and the Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria, CPAs). Despite recent efforts, the marketing function, which includes
the distribution and exchange of agricultural products, is characterized by delayed payments, insufficient collection capacity on the part of Acopio, and
the lack of material incentives and credit financing to
stimulate and incentivize production (Nova, 2010).
Another key measure in the transformation of Cuba’s
non-sugar agricultural sector has been the decentralization and restructuring of the functions of the ministries responsible for the administration, implementation, and oversight of the country’s agricultural
policies. The municipality as an increasingly autonomous economic unit is as the center of this new strategy. The newly-considered model of decentralized
decision making identifies the municipality as the
principal actor responsible for making rational economic decisions and implementing the required
strategies within its territorial boundaries. At present,
each municipality has established a Municipal Delegation of Agriculture (169 in total), which is primarily responsible for managing the transfers of idle
State-owned lands and State-owned livestock to the
non-State sector, to promote and stimulate the development of three “core” modalities of production: (1)
urban agriculture, (2) suburban agriculture, which
covers a span of about 10 km from the periphery of
cities and urban centers, and (3) and productive or
conventional poles (Nova, 2010).
During the testing phase of this model in 2010, the
MINAGRI selected 16 municipalities plus the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud, a total of 17,
to carry across the combination of these three scenarios. Participation was extended to all the entities that
produce food in the municipality, whether or not under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture
(UBPCs, CCS, CPAs, State-owned farms, etc.) (Nova, 2010). In addition, the Ministry of the Economy
and Planning (MEP) has also selected five municipal-
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ities that are supporting financially and decentralized
forms of economic management, for investigation on
solutions on the substitution of imports, export generated funds, on the food and employment problem
(Nova, 2010) The MEP is also implementing a series
of internal reforms to simply the State apparatus and
structures that deal or are in some ways related with
the production, distribution, and consumption of agricultural products. The first step in this direction
was the unification of the Ministry of the Food Industry (Ministerio de la Industria Alimenticia,
MINAL) with the former Ministry of Fisheries.
There have also been discussions about the possible
combination or fusion of the Ministry of Agriculture
and the Ministry of Sugar (Ministerio de la Industria
Azucarera, MINAZ), to create a single Ministry of
Food, which is likely to include diverse areas such as
agriculture (sugar and non-sugar, food processing
and industrial production, and fisheries) (Nova,
2010).
The approval of Agreement 6823 on June 24, 2010
represented another important step in the transformation of Cuba’s non-sugar agriculture sector. This
policy measure authorizes the commercialization (or
trade) of agricultural products in roadside kiosks (or
“points of sale”) operated by agricultural cooperatives
or state enterprises. Producers or their representatives
are authorized to sell their excess output, after their
quotas to the state have been delivered (or met)
(“Acuerdo 6853,” 2010). Agricultural producers or
their representatives are required to pay taxes and/or
fees for the use of these kiosks (or “points of sale”) as
stipulated by Resolution 206 issued by the Ministry
of Prices and Finance. According to Resolution 206,
sellers in the kiosks (or “points of sale”) established
by Agreement 6853 are required to pay a sales tax of
5%, based on their daily gross sales, plus a fee of 2%
of the value of their reported gross sales for the use of
the kiosks and related facilities, and self-employed
workers (who work on these kiosks) are required to
make social security contributions.
The approval of Agreement 6853 (2010) represents a
step in the right direction. However, certain provisions limit its potential. First, the entities or administrative units that administer the kiosks (or “points of
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sale”) are a State-owned entity, which implies that
the State will continue to play a significant role in the
administration of the important sales venues. Second, producers that use these venues to commercialize their agricultural products must first fulfill their
delivery quotas to the State at prices and amounts established by the latter. These conditions limit the autonomy of participants in the kiosks (or “points of
sale”) in terms of determining output prices and
quantity, and are likely to contribute to imbalances
between supply and demand.
Finally, in June 2011 Cuba announced the expansion of bank credit to small-scale agricultural producers and cooperatives. According to an article published in Juventud Rebelde, the Banco de Crédito y
Comercio (BANDEC) had approved credit financing
for an estimated 13,000 farmers (Tamayo, 2011).
Most of these loans are to be used to finance working
capital, facilitate the cultivation of short-term crops
and long-term crops (like sugar), purchase livestock,
and finance the acquisition of physical assets (excluding those related to the removal of “marabú”)
(Tamayo, 2011). Borrowers can use expected sales
(or revenues), income generated through the commercialization of agricultural products, and any other
source of income (remittances?) as collateral for these
loans (Tamayo, 2011).
The extension of bank credit (microloans) to agricultural producers also represents a step in the right direction. However, it is too early to quantify the impact of these loans on output and yields.
RECENT PERFORMANCE (2008–2010)
As Table 3 shows, Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector experienced mixed results during the 2008–2010
period. The production of viandas, a food staple of
vital importance in the traditional Cuban diet, grew
4.6%; roots and tubers increased 8.8%; cereals rose
2.2%; other fruits increased 3.2%, and cocoa production grew 55.4%. By contrast, greens fell 12.2%;
legumes and beans declined 17.3%; tobacco production fell 4.7%; and citrus fruits decreased 12%.
While a portion of these declines can be attributed to
structural problems and deficiencies, such as the lack
of economic (or price) incentives, insufficient inputs,
and excessive bureaucratic constraints, Cuba’s agri-
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Table 3.
Viandas
Roots and tubers
Plantains
Greens
Cereals
Rice
Corn
Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus Fruits
Other Fruits
Cocoa

Cuba: Non-Sugar Agricultural Output, Selected Crops, 2008–2010 Tons
2008
2,150,700
1,392,500
758,200
2,439,300
761,700
436,000
325,700
97,200
97,200
21,500
391,800
738,500
1,100

2009
2,236,000
1,565,600
670,400
2,548,800
868,400
563,600
304,800
110,800
110,800
25,200
418,000
748,000
1,387

2010
2,250,000
1,515,000
735,000
2,141,000
778,900
454,400
324,500
80,400
80,400
20,500
345,000
762,000
1,709

Change
2008 - 2010
99,300
122,500
-23,200
-298,300
17,200
18,400
-1,200
-16,800
-16,800
-1,000
-46,800
23,500
609

% Change
4.62%
8.80%
-3.06%
-12.23%
2.26%
4.22%
-0.37%
-17.28%
-17.28%
-4.65%
-11.94%
3.18%
55.36%

Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.

cultural output has been severely affected by unfavorable climatic conditions such as severe droughts in
and powerful tropical storms and hurricanes. In
2008, the island was impacted by three hurricanes,
which affected its principal agricultural provinces,
Villa Clara, Matanzas and Camagüey, and caused an
estimated $10 billion in damages (equivalent to 20%
of GDP).In response to impact of these hurricanes
on non-sugar agricultural production, in October
2008 the Cuban government implemented a number
of measures to restrict the supply of agricultural
products and prevent speculators and price gougers
from taking advantage of the severe agricultural losses caused by a series of natural disasters. The mechanisms employed were price controls, output restrictions, and strict government supervision of
transactions in the “free farmers’ markets,” Statecontrolled agricultural markets, and the retail outlets
incorporated into the rationing system.
Despite its good intentions, these measures resulted
in negative externalities and contributed to shortlived price pressures in the black market for scarce agricultural products. In some parts of the island, agricultural markets suffered from insufficient supplies,
particularly those in which prices and output were
primarily determined by the forces of supply and demand, and the price controls placed affected producers in the difficult predicament of not being able to
cover their losses, which eventually were transferred
to the State via Acopio’s supply chain and distribution
network.

To counter speculative forces, the State imposed a series of requirements that restricted output and prevented some producers from reaching the multiple
distribution channels through which they could offer
their agricultural goods, resulting in a notable decrease in supply by the end of 2008. Ironically, the
government’s swift response to the devastation suffered by Cuba’s agricultural sector in the aftermath
of the 2008 hurricane season, in some instances, resulted in the opposite effect: prices rose as output declined, disproportionally hurting the economically
vulnerable segments of the population that the government was trying to protect.
The resulting supply shock had far reaching consequences. By the end of 2008 and the earlier part of
2009, a large number of neighborhood agricultural
stalls, which were typically scattered through Cuba’s
169 municipalities and served as the main outlet to
purchase domestic agricultural products for the majority of the country’s population, closed down due
to insufficient supply and agricultural fairs were discontinued (Nova, 2010). In the case of the neighborhood agricultural stalls, it is worth noting that these
low-scale outlets are mainly supplied by the cooperative sector, offer a greater consistency in supply, better product selection and quality, and competitive
prices when compared with their State-run counterparts and the agricultural products offered through
Cuba’s vast network of “hard currency stores” (Nova,
2010). These establishments offer an additional convenience: they are the are conveniently located close
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Table 4.
Viandas
Roots and tubers
Plantains
Greens
Cereals
Rice
Corn
Legumes
Beans
Tobacco
Citrus Fruits
Other Fruits
Cocoa

Cuba: Non- Sugar Agricultural, Yields, Selected Crops (tons per hectare)
2008
7.69
7.10
9.07
9.42
2.68
2.80
2.52
1.02
1.02
0.93
8.59
8.89
0.29

2009
6.34
6.36
6.30
9.15
2.07
2.61
1.49
0.74
0.74
1.01
8.72
8.16
0.27

2010
6.20
6.21
6.17
9.05
1.94
2.58
1.44
0.71
0.71
1.01
8.00
7.86
0.32

Change
2008 - 2010
-1.49
-0.89
-2.90
-0.37
-0.73
-0.23
-1.08
-0.31
-0.31
0.08
-0.59
-1.03
0.03

% Change
-19.4%
-12.5%
-32.0%
-3.9%
-27.5%
-8.1%
-42.8%
-30.1%
-30.1%
8.5%
-6.9%
-11.5%
11.1%

Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.

to consumers’ homes, which represents a tremendous
advantage for the majority of households in a country where the majority of the population (close to
78%) lives in urban centers, and convenient means
of transportation are relative scarce and terribly expensive.
During the 2008–2010 period agricultural yields exhibited mostly negative tendencies, with the exception of tobacco (8.5%), and cocoa (11.1%). This was
mainly attributed to the scarcity of agricultural inputs (e.g., pesticides, fertilizer, and fuel), the impact
of adverse climatic conditions, and shortages of labor
inputs (Table 4).
One contradictory aspect of Cuban agriculture is
that despite recent policy measures to increase the
role of the Non-State sector, the State continues to
play a key role in this vital area of the Cuban economy. Output by the Non-State sector is greater than
80% in eight out of the nine agricultural product categories reported by the National Statistical Office
(ONE) in 2010. This apparent contradiction stems
from the fact that Cuban agricultural figures consider
output and land held by the UBPCs (Units of Basic
Cooperative Production) as part of the Non-State
sector despite the limitations (administrative, managerial, and operational) confronted by these entities.

TOWARDS MARKET SOCIALISM?
The experiences of the countries that have transitioned from the classical socialist model to market socialism suggest that this process is driven in large part
by the need to increase labor productivity and improve economic efficiency. As the transition from the
classical (socialist) model to the reformed (or market
based) socialist model takes place, salaries and compensation are transformed to improve the productivity of labor, and increase economic efficiency and the
profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) undergoing “enterprise perfectioning.” Despite the emphasis given to profitability, efficiency, and productivity, the desired results or outcomes are hardly ever
achieved in the majority of SOEs, because in practice
profitability (or the lack thereof), efficiency, and productivity are rarely considered determining factors of
the future viability of these enterprises, given the
continuity of some of the practices inherited from
the classical system, which “soften” their budget constraint.1
The private sector plays greater role in the economy,
and part of the economically active population employed by the State sector at the onset of the reform
process is allowed (and sometimes left with no alternative but) to “migrate” to the emerging private sector. Output in the Non-State sector, as a share of to-

1. According to Kornai (1992), some of the commonly-used practices that “soften” the budget constraint of SOEs undergoing “enterprise perfectioning” under market socialism include: (1) indirect subsidies, (2) tax reductions, (3) State-provided credit and financing,
and (4) favorable price policies.
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tal output, increases during the period of transition,
as it absorbs some of the (excess) inputs (i.e., labor
and capital) released by the State sector. Higher earnings and increased managerial autonomy function as
“pull factors” in the Non-State sector, providing the
necessary economic incentives for part of the economically active population to exit the State sector.
The State sector’s share of total output and employment declines, as more workers “migrate” to the
emerging private sector in search of higher wages and
compensation.
Despite the Non-State sector’s growing role in the
economy, based on its share of total output and land
under cultivation reported by the National Statistics
Office (ONE), it remains under the “shadow” of the
State, resulting in one of the major contradictions of
Cuba’s form of market socialism. While the prices of
some agricultural products have been partially liberalized, which as conventional economic theory suggests has incentivized production and within the constraints under which the Cuban economy currently
operates contributed to an improved (i.e., more efficient) allocation of scarce resources in some areas of
the economy, price controls, subsidies, and other
forms of non-market allocation in other areas still
contribute to shortages, the production of goods and
services of inferior quality, inefficient resource allocation, waste, mismanagement, and other distortions
commonly associated with centralized planning.
Notwithstanding the partial recovery of some segments of Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector, output and yields are still significantly depressed when
compared to the performance levels reported in 1989
(the year that marked the beginning of the economic
crisis en the nineties and the “Special Period”). Figures pertaining to agricultural yields (i.e., output per
hectare) demonstrate a decreasing tendency, as a result of endogenous and exogenous factors related to
agricultural production.
In terms of the policy measures recently implemented to non-cane agricultural production in Cuba, it is
worth noting that even though there have been some
positive results since 2008, there is still much more
to do to stimulate agricultural production in Cuba.
The mere delivery of idle State-owned land in usu-

fruct to private producers and agricultural cooperatives is unlikely to result in significant and sustainable increases in production in the long-run. As of
the end of 2009, Cuban officials reported that an estimated 920,000 hectares (of idle State-owned land)
had been transferred to more than 100,000 recipients
(or beneficiaries) (Hagelberg, 2010). While this measure undoubtedly represents a movement from a
State-centric model of agricultural production to a
more decentralized form of land tenure, similar to
the one implemented in Vietnam at the onset of its
Doi Moi reform process in 1986, the lukewarm response considering the potential number of persons
who might have applied for the permits to farm these
lands under less uncertain circumstances suggests the
need to further expand this measure.
Hagelberg (2010) correctly states that “the authorities were admittedly overwhelmed by the flood of requests for plots triggered by Decree-Law No. 259”
and cites Cuban media reports that indicate that the
number of applicants increased substantially from
2008 to 2009. While those figures are impressive,
given the limitations and constrains of Decree-Law
No. 259, it seems reasonable to believe that they are
probably far below their true potential. This “true
hidden potential”—referring to the number of persons who would probably apply for permits to farm
on
State-owned
lands
under
different
circumstances—is probably discouraged by the difficulties faced by recent applicants such as the lack of
necessary tools and inputs, particularly fuel, pesticide, and fertilizers, the inhospitable conditions of
the lands to be cultivated, and the lack of adequate
infrastructure, including housing, barns, stables, storage facilities, etc.
To encourage the revival of Cuba’s non-cane agriculture, it is fundamental to experiment with new forms
of property, including individual or private property
with clearly-defined transfer and inheritance rights,
and the capacity to earn, payout, and even repatriate
after-tax profits. This does not imply the complete
abolition of existing forms of collective property such
as agricultural cooperatives (e.g., Cooperativas de Production Agrícola—CPAs, Cooperativas de Créditos y
Servicios—CCS, etc); but rather that complementary
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relations that may exist between these forms of properties and private property. In the process of transforming the Cuban economic model alternative
property forms property must play a fundamental
role to ensure the success of economic policies and
strategies designed with this purpose in mind; the experiences of China and Vietnam in agriculture demonstrate that these changes or transformations must
be simultaneously incremental and tangible in order
to reach their goals.
Recent efforts to advance a decentralized model of
suburban agriculture in Cuba represent a gradual,
but positive, step towards market socialism. In contrast to the more centralized model of urban agriculture implemented as a response to the “food crisis” of
the early 1990s, the principal operational structures
in the model of suburban agriculture currently being
encouraged by the Cuban government are smallscale, eco-friendly, privately-owned farms or fincas
located a few kilometers from urban centers (Hagelberg, 2010). Cuba’s suburban agriculture strategy
aims to reduce the distance between producers and
consumers, curtail fuel consumption, and reduce Cuba’s dependence on imported food and fuel (Hagelberg, 2010). While the emphasis of this alternative
mode of production is on energy conservation and
sustainability, the development of local and regional
market-based coordination mechanisms can play an
important role in the success of this strategy.

The relatively low agricultural yields in Cuba’s agricultural sector point out to the need to improve total
factor productivity. To achieve this goal structural
measures that allow greater integration of technology
and foreign capital should be considered, along with
labor market reforms that improve the relationship
between results and earnings, and policy transformations to allow greater participation by the Non-State
sector, especially private farmers, improved access to
credit financing and diversified sources of capital, including private investment, and greater availability of
essential agricultural inputs and supplies such as fertilizer, fuel, irrigation equipment, machinery, seeds,
etc.
Given its long and successful participation in important clusters of non-cane agriculture in Cuba, the private sector should be allowed to play a larger role in
the recovery and revival of this important sector of
the economy. However, the expansion of the private
sector should be conducted in gradual and regulated
manner, particularly with regards to labor practices,
the accumulation and transfer of assets, and health
and safety standards. In this context, a strong but not
antagonistic State, with the capacity to adapt and innovate, particularly on the regulatory front, but not
completely malleable by the brutal forces of market
capitalism, could play a vital role to ensure and promote agricultural self-sufficiency and national food
security in Cuba.
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